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ABSTRACT
This contribution analyses how EU social objectives and policy co-ordination
have been integrated into the Union’s post-crisis governance architecture. It
argues that between 2011 and 2016, there was a partial but progressive
‘socialization’ of the ‘European Semester’ of policy co-ordination, in terms of
increasing emphasis on social objectives in its priorities and key messages,
including the Country-Specific Recommendations; intensified social
monitoring and review of national reforms; and an enhanced decision-making
role for EU social and employment actors. In explaining these developments,
the contribution highlights the contribution of strategic agency, reflexive
learning and creative adaptation by social and employment actors to the new
institutional conditions of the Semester, building on recent theoretical work
on ‘actor-centred constructivism’ and the ‘usages of Europe’.
KEYWORDS Actor-centred constructivism; economic governance; European Semester; policy co-
ordination; social and employment policy
Introduction
Since the onset of the euro crisis, the European Union (EU) has introduced a
series of far-reaching changes in its socio-economic governance architecture
(see the introduction to this collection). At its core is the ‘European Semester’
of policy co-ordination, through which the Commission, the Council and the
European Council set priorities for the Union; review national performance
and reform programs; and issue Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs)
to member states, backed up in some cases by possible financial sanctions.
The European Semester (henceforth ‘Semester’) brings together within a
single annual policy co-ordination cycle a wide range of EU governance instru-
ments with different legal bases and sanctioning authority. This process has
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given the EU institutions a more prominent role than ever before in scrutiniz-
ing and guiding national economic, fiscal and social policies, especially within
the euro area.
The advent of the Semester has raised a set of contested questions about
the relationship between social and economic policy co-ordination within the
EU’s new post-crisis governance architecture. Has the integration of EU social
policy co-ordination, as developed through the Open Method of Coordination
on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (‘Social OMC’), into the Europe 2020
Strategy and the Semester resulted in its subordination to fiscal discipline and
budgetary austerity objectives imposed by the main economic policy actors?1
Or has such integration instead offered new opportunities for social and
employment policy actors2 to defend and mainstream EU social objectives,
such as the adequacy and accessibility of pensions and health care or the
fight against poverty and social exclusion, throughout the Semester process?
Critiques of the Semester’s social dimension have revolved around three
interrelated empirical claims. The first concerns the subordination of social
objectives to higher-order economic goals within the EU’s post-crisis govern-
ance architecture. Thus Crespy and Menz (2015a: 762) contend that ‘the
slippage of Europe 2020 into the European Semester… has meant the
further absorption of social policy into macroeconomic policy’. Hence, in
their view, EU ‘social policy is becoming increasingly… subsumed to econ-
omic objectives focused on competitiveness, narrowly defined as low
labour costs… and stringent fiscal discipline’ (Crespy and Menz 2015b:
199–200). For Degryse et al. (2014: 70), similarly, ‘the CSRs reflect a particular
concept of the European economic model… focused on growth and compe-
titiveness, while neglecting… the principal role of social policies… ’. More
strongly still, Copeland and Daly (2015: 150) assert that ‘the European Seme-
ster has served as a focal point to organize a form of economic governance in
which national budgetary discipline and the correction of macroeconomic
imbalances… have been made the principles on which all other policy objec-
tives are dependent’.
The second claim advanced by the Semester’s critics concerns the domi-
nance of EU economic policy actors over their social and employment
policy counterparts within its decision-making procedures. Thus as de la
Porte and Heins (2014: 169–70) contend, ‘Europe 2020 is dominated by DG
ECFIN and the ECOFIN Council with a very marginal role for the European
social policy actors’ (cf. also Degryse et al. 2014). Such power imbalances
within the Semester, they argue, reflect the fact that the economic actors
‘operate in areas where the EU has strong jurisdiction’, unlike their social
counterparts, who are responsible for fields ‘where the EU has only weak leg-
islative competence’ (de la Porte and Heins 2015: 12). For Copeland and Daly
(2015: 150, 153), likewise, the structure of the Semester privileges economic
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policy actors and ‘formalizes the historically disadvantaged position within the
EU’s political hierarchy of social actors’.
The third claim underpinning the social critique of the Semester concerns its
coercive and prescriptive character. Many commentators have seen the
process as a centralized mechanism for imposing structural reforms on
member states, including in areas of primary national competence such as
social and employment policy, through CSRs underpinned by the threat of
sanctions under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and Macroeconomic
Imbalance Procedure (MIP). Dawson (2015: 984), for example, asserts that the
new ‘post-crisis economic governance in many ways entails a return to
“command-and-control” regulation’, whereby ‘national diversity… is often
placedwithin strict limits with high levels of supra-national policy prescription’.
While Dawson (2015: 984–6) and Degryse et al. (2014: 72, 76) highlight the
uniform ‘one-size-fits-all’ message embodied in the CSRs, other critics such as
Scharpf (2013: 137–8) decry instead their discretionary application, involving
‘a radical extension of hierarchical European controls over national policy
choices’. Either way, however, de la Porte and Heins (2014: 170) contend that
‘the European Semester and the instruments designed to re-enforce it are
highly intrusive along the dimensions of policy interference, surveillance, as
well as coercion’. Within the Semester, they conclude, fiscal and budgetary gov-
ernance instruments ‘have become more precise in terms of objectives, and
stricter in terms of surveillance and enforcement’, while social and labour
market policy instruments remain weaker on these dimensions and thus in
their ‘potential impact’ (de la Porte and Heins 2015: 10).
By contrast, a second body of recent research has drawn attention to the
gradual evolution of the Semester in a more socially balanced direction in
relation to each of the preceding empirical claims. Thus Bekker has analysed
the changing content of the CSRs, finding not only an increasing emphasis on
social and employment issues, but also that even recommendations issued
under the SGP and the MIP sometimes promote EU social objectives such
as accessibility of health care and the fight against poverty and social
exclusion (Bekker 2015; Bekker and Klosse 2013). Coding the policy measures
contained in the CSRs between those promoting ‘social investment’ as
opposed to austerity or ‘social retrenchment’, Crespy and Vanheuverzwijn
(2016: 77–8, 85–6) estimate that the proportion of the former has increased
from 50 per cent to 64 per cent between 2011 and 2016.3 Focusing on
poverty and social inclusion, Jessoula (2015: 496) observes that the growing
number of CSRs on this issue was ‘the result of the process whereby DG
EMPL learnt how to defend and support the Europe 2020 social dimension
in inter-DGs bargaining at the various stages of the Semester’. Finally,
Bekker has examined the CSRs and National Reform Programs (NRPs) of
France, Germany, Poland and Spain between 2009 and 2014, concluding
that while the degree of flexibility varies across countries and over time,
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‘the European Semester, including the SGP, allows for developing alternative
socio-economic policies’ (Bekker 2016: 62).
Building on this latter body of work, along with two earlier research
reports of our own (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014; Vanhercke et al., 2015),
this contribution analyses the evolution and dynamics of the Semester
from its inception in 2010 through the 2016 cycle, bringing new evidence
to bear on the main disputed questions about the relationship between
social and economic policy co-ordination in the EU’s post-crisis governance
architecture. The contribution makes two major contributions to this debate.
The first is empirical: drawing on 76 interviews with key policy players as well
as a systematic analysis of EU documents, we demonstrate that over this
period there was a partial but progressive ‘socialization’ of the Semester,
both in terms of its substantive content and its governance procedures.
This socialization, as we define it, comprises: 1) a growing emphasis on
social objectives in the Semester’s policy orientations and messages, embo-
died in the AGS and especially the CSRs; (2) intensified monitoring, surveil-
lance, and review of national reforms by EU social and employment policy
actors and (3) an enhanced role for these actors relative to their economic
policy counterparts in drafting, reviewing and amending the CSRs. Finally,
regarding the Semester’s prescriptive and coercive character, the contri-
bution shows that a concerted pushback by the Employment, Social
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs (EPSCO) Council and its advisory com-
mittees against the Commission’s perceived efforts to impose uniform,
over-detailed recommendations on social and employment issues resulted
in significant revisions to the Semester’s decision-making arrangements,
including the CSRs themselves, which have made them less hierarchical
and more interactive. The second major contribution is explanatory and
theoretical. In accounting for the empirical developments traced in the con-
tribution, we highlight the contribution of strategic agency, reflexive learning
and creative adaptation to the new institutional conditions of the European
Semester by the key actors, especially on the social and employment side.
The remainder of the contribution is organized as follows. Section 2 pre-
sents the theoretical approach, building on ‘actor-centred constructivism’
and the ‘usages of Europe’, along with the data and methods supporting
the empirical analysis. Section 3 examines the relationship between social
and economic policy co-ordination from the Lisbon Strategy to Europe
2020 and the inception of the Semester. Section 4 analyses the socialization
of the Semester under the Barroso Commission (2012–2014), in terms both
of policy orientations and governance procedures. Section 5 shows how
this socialization was further institutionalized under the Juncker Commission.
The final section summarizes the empirical evidence and revisits our contri-
bution to the ongoing academic debate.
152 J. ZEITLIN AND B. VANHERCKE
Theoretical approach, data and methods
In explaining the partial but progressive socialization of the European Seme-
ster between 2010 and 2016, this contribution focuses on the strategic agency
and creative adaptation to changing institutional conditions of the key actors
concerned. Here we draw on and extend recent theoretical work on ‘sociologi-
cal approaches’ to European integration and policy-making, notably ‘actor-
centred constructivism’ (Saurugger 2009, 2016) and the ‘usages of Europe’
(Jacquot and Woll 2003; Woll and Jacquot 2010). These approaches provide
valuable conceptual resources for understanding how apparently weaker
players, such as the EU social and employment policy actors, can advance
their substantive goals and decision-making influence in complex multi-
level governance processes like the European Semester, despite the insti-
tutional asymmetries and structural power imbalances emphasized by the
critical literature discussed in the previous section.
As presented by Saurugger, ‘actor-centred constructivist’ approaches to
the EU diverge from standard rationalist and historical institutionalist analyses
that overstate the weight of structural constraints and path dependence on
actors’ choices, while underestimating the ‘possibilities for actors to modify
the rules and institutions in which they act’. Such actor-centred approaches,
in her formulation, likewise differ from classic constructivist and sociological
institutionalist accounts that emphasize how dominant cognitive frames
and taken-for-granted norms shape actors’ behaviour, thereby downplaying
their ‘room for manoeuvre in power struggles and social conflicts’. In this
view, too, actors’ capacities for action are not ‘entirely predefined’ either by
their resource endowments or by the structure of the field in which they
operate; instead actors ‘are able to adapt and to change their environment’
(Saurugger 2016: 73–5).
Work on the ‘usages of Europe’ gives concrete form to actor-centred
constructivism as defined above by analysing how different types of actors
identify and strategically exploit opportunities within EU multi-level govern-
ance processes to advance their own preferences and objectives. The
concept of usages ‘highlights how actors engage with, interpret, appropriate
or ignore the dynamics of European integration’. This means that actors can
fail to seize opportunities for action identified by external observers, either
because they do not perceive them as such or because they are more con-
cerned with the possible risks than the potential benefits involved. Moreover,
while actors intentionally make use of the opportunities and resources they
find in EU institutions and policies to pursue their own goals, the outcome
may not be identical to the original objective, since ‘the effects of an action
are often not entirely predictable or controllable’. Finally, ‘as strategic as
usages may be initially’, in the longer term, as Woll and Jacquot (2010:
115–6) observe, they ‘entail cognitive and/or normative adaptation by
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actors and their political environment, which in turn affects their subsequent
behaviour and positioning’. Just as there is ‘no impact of Europe without
usage’ by the actors (Jacquot and Woll 2003: 5–6), so too as another scholar
working within this approach remarks, there are ‘no usages of Europe
without impact’ (Sanchez Salgado 2014: 203).
Although the usages of Europe, like actor-centred constructivism, has been
conceived as a general conceptual approach to European integration and
policy-making, it has mainly been applied to the strategic identification and
‘creative appropriation’ of opportunities arising from EU governance pro-
cesses (including both the OMC and the Lisbon Strategy) by national-level
actors to advance their own domestic objectives and agendas (Barcevičius
et al. 2014; Graziano et. 2011; Jacquot and Woll 2003; Woll and Jacquot
2010). But as their proponents explicitly envisage, these approaches can
also be used to illuminate the evolution and dynamics of EU governance
processes themselves. Thus, for example, the ‘usages of Europe’ approach
draws attention to how actors situated at the intersection between national
and supranational policy-making (such as EU committees of member-state
officials) may strategically exploit the ambiguities of European concepts,
rules and procedures in order to reframe policy issues, build political
coalitions, enhance their institutional influence, and justify decisions taken
at the EU as well as the domestic level (Woll and Jacquot 2010: 116–7).
In this contribution, we extend the insights of these agency-focused and
possibility-orientated approaches by tracing how reflexive learning from
past experience by key actors, especially on the social and employment
side, together with creative adaptation of their own organization and prac-
tices to the new institutional conditions of the EU’s post-crisis governance
architecture, has contributed to the partial but progressive socialization of
the Semester. Here we focus on how EU social and employment policy
actors have deliberately revised their working methods and styles of argu-
ment to gain traction in ‘evidence-based’ deliberation with their economic
policy counterparts. At the same time, we analyse how the arguments and
demands advanced by the social players through the Semester process
have helped to change the broader ‘rules of the game’ and influence the pos-
itions of their economic policy interlocutors.
In terms of data sources, this contribution draws on six rounds of elite inter-
views, conducted between 2010 and 2016, with current and former members
of the European Commission (multiple DGs); Council advisory committees
(EMCO, SPC, EPC, EFC); EU social partners and NGO networks; the European
Council and Council Secretariat; and the European Parliament. A total of 76
interviews were conducted with 61 separate individuals. Some interviews
involved multiple participants, while 17 people were interviewed two to
four times in light of their key role in the development of the Semester.
Nearly all interviewees agreed to be quoted, provided that the source could
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not be identified, e.g., by naming only their institutional affiliation rather than
their specific position. Interviews cited in the text are referred to by a unique
code, the key to which is presented in Online Appendix Section 1, along with a
complete list of interviews by date.
This contribution is also based on near-complete access to the papers of
the Employment Committee (EMCO) and the Social Protection Committee
(SPC) during this period. These papers, which include documents from the
EU economic policy actors, allow a fine-grained process tracing of decision-
making within each Semester cycle, and were used to triangulate information
from the interviews. For reasons of space, we have supported empirical claims
in the main text with more extensive quotations from interviews and EU docu-
ments in Online Appendix Section 4.4
Given the nature of our sources, the analysis in this contribution focuses on
the evolution and dynamics of the European Semester at EU level, rather than its
causal influence in the member states, which requires a different research
approach, based on comparative process tracing of national policy-making.
The European Semester and the Europe 2020 strategy:
advancing or subverting Social Europe?
The relationship between social and economic policy co-ordination has been
a hot-button issue at EU level since the late 1990s. A key impetus for the cre-
ation of the OMC processes on pensions and health/long-term care in the
early 2000s came from EU social policy actors’ efforts to ensure that the
social objectives of these fields were not eclipsed by the fiscal and budgetary
focus of EU economic policy co-ordination. Hence the objectives of the pen-
sions and healthcare OMCs included social adequacy, quality and accessibility
as well as financial sustainability (Barcevičius et al. 2014: ch. 2).
The Europe 2020 Strategy, adopted in 2010, was designed to have a
stronger social dimension, compared to the preceding Lisbon Strategy,
which had focused primarily on growth and jobs after its 2005 relaunch.
Europe 2020 featured ‘inclusive growth’, by ‘fostering a high employment
economy delivering economic, social and territorial cohesion’, as one of
three overarching priorities, along with an EU-wide headline target, aimed
at lifting ‘at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion’.
It also incorporated for the first time a separate guideline on ‘Promoting
social inclusion and combating poverty’, which highlighted the contribution
to social cohesion of pensions, healthcare and public services. At the same
time, however, there was a founding ambiguity within the Strategy about
the relationship between fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance by the
ECOFIN Council and ‘thematic co-ordination’ by the other Council formations
of progress towards the Europe 2020 goals, targets and guidelines (Barcevi-
čius et al. 2014: 31–4).
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Initial experiences under the Semester seemed to confirm critics’ worst
fears that the new integrated EU policy co-ordination framework would
result in the subordination of social objectives to fiscal consolidation, budget-
ary austerity and welfare retrenchment imposed by economic policy actors
(Pochet 2010). The first Annual Growth Survey (AGS) and CSRs5 focused pri-
marily on fiscal consolidation, while pushing for financial reform of pension
and healthcare systems, tax and benefit shifts to ‘make work pay’, revision
of employment protection legislation and measures to contain wage
growth (Bieling 2012: 264). Only three countries received CSRs explicitly
addressing poverty and social inclusion, despite weak national targets,
which the Commission acknowledged would not together meet the EU-
wide poverty target by 2020 (European Commission 2011: 5). But many
member states also received recommendations urging them to enhance
the effectiveness of active labour market policies for vulnerable groups (10);
expand childcare provision (5); reduce school drop-out rates, improve
access to education and training and encourage lifelong learning (9). Ten of
the fifteen countries receiving CSRs on reducing early labour-market exit
and linking the statutory retirement age to life expectancy were likewise
urged to ensure the adequacy of pension benefits, especially through active
ageing measures aimed at maintaining the employability of older workers
(own analysis based on European Parliament 2013;6 cf. Clauwaert 2014: 11;
Gómez Urquijo 2017: 7.) Overall, Crespy and Vanheuverzwijn (2016: 77–8) esti-
mate that the social and employment policy measures recommended in the
2011 CSRs were evenly divided between those promoting social retrench-
ment and social investment.
Procedurally, the first Semester cycle followed a prescriptive ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach, with limited adaptation of the CSRs to the specific situation of
individual Member States (Bekker 2013: 15–16). The EU institutions explicitly
sought to use multilateral surveillance by Member States of each other’s pol-
icies and performance to exert peer pressure for implementation of structural
reforms (EMCO 2012; President of the European Council 2011). Social actors at
both EU and national level conversely found themselves largely excluded
from preparation and review of the National Reform Programmes (NRPs)
and CSRs (SPC 2011b).
At the same time, the Commission withdrew its support for the Social OMC
as an autonomous process. Member states were no longer requested to
produce National Social Reports (NSRs), while the Commission also withdrew
from the production of the annual Joint Report on Social Protection and Social
Inclusion. A key motivation in both cases was the insistence by the Commis-
sion, particularly its Secretariat-General (SECGEN), that there should be no par-
allel policy co-ordination processes outside Europe 2020, which one high-
ranking Commission official called ‘the only game in town’ for Social
Europe, and that social reporting should be channelled exclusively through
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the Semester (Barcevičius et al. 2014: 34–5; SPC 2011a; COM-COORD6; COM-
EMPL7).
Socializing the Semester 2012–2014
Policy orientations
As the sovereign debt crisis within the eurozone morphed into a broader
economic downturn, leading to a rapid erosion of public support for the
EU, a significant rebalancing between social, economic and employment
objectives became visible in the policy orientation of successive European
Semesters.
The 2011 AGS had set three overarching priorities for the EU: ‘rigorous fiscal
consolidation for enhancing macroeconomic stability’, ‘labour market reforms
for higher employment’ and ‘growth enhancing measures’. The 2012 AGS
replaced these with a more socially balanced set of priorities, including ‘tack-
ling unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis’, which were
reaffirmed in 2013 and 2014.
As EU institutions came under increasing pressure to tackle the deepening
economic and employment crisis, the Commission and particularly DG EMPL
responded by launching a succession of socially orientated ‘pacts’ and
‘packages’. Foremost among these were the Employment Package (April
2012), the ‘Compact for Growth and Jobs’ (June 2012), the Youth Employment
Package (December 2012) and the Social Investment Package (February 2013).
Alongside specific policy measures (notably the Youth Guarantee) and EU rec-
ommendations (on child poverty and active inclusion), a key feature of these
pacts and packages was that implementation of the proposed measures
should be reported on, monitored and reviewed within the Semester.
As the Semester’s policy priorities, expressed through the AGS and other
Commission initiatives, shifted towards a more socially balanced stance, so
too did the CSRs, whose social orientation expanded steadily between 2012
and 2014. For reasons of space, we do not analyse the 2012 and 2013 CSRs
here, but jump directly to those for 2014, the final year of the Barroso
Commission.7
In 2014, twelve member states received recommendations on poverty
and social inclusion, of whom nine were urged to ensure the adequacy and
coverage of their social assistance and unemployment benefits. Nineteen
received recommendations on reform of their healthcare and/or pension
systems, whose purpose according to the Commission was to ensure that
they ‘continue to be socially adequate’ and ‘to provide universal access to
high-quality care’, as well as to be cost-effective and financially sustainable
(European Commission 2014a: 8–10). Five countries were specifically urged
to safeguard the accessibility and quality of health and long-term care,
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while eleven were exhorted to promote the employability of older workers,
e.g., by expanding lifelong learning. As in previous years, however, not all
CSRs dealing with social and employment issues could be considered ‘socially
orientated’, and a number of countries continued to receive recommen-
dations to reform their wage determination systems to improve competitive-
ness (6), reduce employment protection for insiders (4) or strengthen job
search requirements for unemployment benefits (1).
Such recommendations were largely outnumbered by CSRs urging
member states to improve their education, training, and activation systems
(all except the Netherlands); reduce early school leaving (8); improve skills
and training (21); implement the youth guarantee (8); enhance educational
outcomes and access to the labour market for disadvantaged groups (12);
increase the availability, accessibility and quality of childcare (9) and public
social services (6) (own analysis based on European Parliament 2014; cf.
European Commission 2014a: 17; SPC 2014; Clauwaert 2014: 14; Gómez
Urquijo 2017: 7–8).
Other systematic analyses of the Semester’s evolution largely confirm this
trend towards a progressive expansion in the number and scope of socially
orientated CSRs from 2011 to 2014. Thus, a report by the European Trade
Union Institute found that the number of specific recommendations within
the CSRs addressing social and employment policy issues rose steadily from
95 in 2011 to 140 in 2014, accounting in each year for 40–47 per cent of the
total (Clauwaert 2015: 11). Bekker’s (2015) more comprehensive content analy-
sis of the 2013 CSRs, which includes education and health care, concluded that
67 of the 141 recommendations contained at least one item addressing
employment or social policies, while 11 more requested recipients to adopt
a ‘growth friendly approach’ to fiscal consolidation. Using an expansive defi-
nition of anti-poverty policies (including ‘improving social transfers’, ‘accessibil-
ity to social services’, ‘improving the employability of at-risk-of-poverty’ groups’
and ‘specific measures to alleviate poverty of vulnerable groups’), Gómez
Urquijo (2017: 5–8) found that the number of countries receiving recommen-
dations under one ormore of these headings increased from four in 2011 to six
in 2012, twenty in 2013 and eighteen in 2014. Finally, Crespy and Vanheuverz-
wijn (2016: 77–8) estimate that the proportion of social and employment policy
measures in the CSRs promoting social investment rather than retrenchment
expanded year by year from 50 per cent in 2011 to 60 per cent in 2014.
Governance procedures
The substantive reorientation of the European Semester towards a more
socially balanced policy stance from 2011 to 2014 was accompanied by a
set of procedural developments, which have reinforced the role of social
and employment policy actors in its governance.
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The progressive opening up of the CSRs to social issues reflects the fact that
the process of drafting them became increasingly collaborative within the
Commission itself. The groundwork for the CSRs is prepared by Country
Teams led by SECGEN, with bottom-up input from desk officers and
support from horizontal policy units across a wide range of DGs, including
those responsible for health, education, enterprise and justice, as well as
the other ‘core’ DGs: ECFIN, EMPL and (until 2015) Taxation and Customs
Union (TAXUD). The CSRs themselves are drafted by the Country Team
leaders, drawing on ‘intelligence, ideas, and some wording’ supplied by the
various DGs, which are then discussed by the Directors of the core DGs,
before being approved by the College of Commissioners, which often
makes final changes. Our interviewees argued that this process has become
increasingly deliberative and ‘evidence-based’. DG EMPL officials involved in
the process underlined how this emphasis on evidence and argument
could overturn any implicit hierarchy among the participating units. A clear
case in point was the 2014 CSRs on implementation of the youth guarantee
scheme, which were initially opposed by both DGs ECFIN and SECGEN, but
where DG EMPL eventually succeeded in getting them through based on evi-
dence from the Country Teams and Staff Working Documents (COM-COORD4;
COM-EMPL2, 6, 8, 10; EPC4) [1].
The other major developments that reinforced the role of social and
employment policy actors during the Barroso era were driven by the EPSCO
Council and especially its advisory committees. The first of these changes
was the 2011 SPC initiative, subsequently endorsed by EPSCO, to ‘reinvigorate’
the Social OMC (SPC 2011a). Member states were invited to prepare regular
National Social Reports, to be submitted alongside the NRPs, while the SPC
also took over responsibility for the production of an annual Social Europe
Report, replacing the previous Joint Report with the Commission.
In addition to reinvigorating the Social OMC, the SPC established itself as a
significant player in monitoring, reviewing and assessing national reforms
within the European Semester, alongside EMCO, EPC and EFC. At the EPSCO
Council’s request, EMCO and the SPC developed a Europe 2020 Joint Assess-
ment Framework (JAF) for monitoring the Employment Guidelines (European
Commission-EMCO-SPC 2010), which since 2013 has been extended to health-
care (SPC 2013; Baeten and Vanhercke 2016: 14). The results of the JAF feed
into the Employment and Social Protection Performance Monitors (EPM,
SPPM) developed by the two committees. These Monitors include visual rep-
resentations of member states’ comparative performance against a battery of
indicators, along with detailed country profiles summarizing key challenges or
negative ‘trends to watch’, as well as good outcomes (EMCO 2016a; SPC
2012b). Both EMCO and the SPC are committed to using their Monitors as
analytical tools to underpin multilateral surveillance and support member
states in setting reform priorities, identifying good practices and stimulating
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mutual learning, while also feeding into the broader EU policy debate. They
likewise serve as an important point of reference for discussions within the
committees about amendments to the Commission’s proposed CSRs (COM-
EMPL3, 6; EMCO1, 3; SPC2, 3) [2].
This extended social and employment policy monitoring was accompanied
by intensified multilateral surveillance and peer review within both
committees. By all accounts, multilateral surveillance in EMCO has become pro-
gressively more critical, more focused, and more evidence-based (EMCO Chair
2012; EMCO1-5, 7; COM-COORD4) [3]. Whereas until 2012 SPC peer reviews
occurred once a year, focused rather superficially on the NSRs, now multilateral
surveillance activities are conducted throughout the year, with in-depth the-
matic and country reviews focused on member states’ responses to past CSRs
and negative ‘trends to watch’ in their social performance. SPC members
were asked in 2012 if theywere ready tomake country surveillance ‘less descrip-
tive, more critical’ and more analytical (SPC 2012a), which subsequent intervie-
wees confirmed has in fact occurred (COM-EMPL6; SPC3, 4) [3]. On overlapping
issues like employment and healthcare, SPC reviews of CSR implementation are
conducted jointly with EMCO and (since 2013) with theWorking Party on Public
Health at Senior Level (WPPHSL) (Baeten and Vanhercke 2016: 13). As in EMCO,
the written conclusions of these multilateral reviews are submitted to the
Council and contribute to discussions on proposed CSRs.
Both EMCO and the SPC have thus been seeking to combine ‘tougher’
multilateral surveillance in employment and social policies with increased
opportunities for deliberation and mutual learning. Commission officials as
well as committee members see this mutual surveillance process as a ‘game
changer’, making exchanges within the committees less ‘cozy’ and more
incisive than in the past, while transforming ‘the bilateral discussion on the
CSRs between Member States and the Commission into a multilateral decision
making process’ (COM-COORD4; EMCO3, 5; SPC3) [4].
Such intensified monitoring, multilateral surveillance and peer review in
turn has formed the basis for enhanced input by EMCO and the SPC into
the adoption of the CSRs. In the 2011 Semester, the SPC and the EPSCO
Council were largely excluded from the review and adoption of the CSRs.
From 2012, however, the SPC began to acquire a more influential place in
the process, drawing on the expertise gained through its monitoring,
surveillance and review activities, as well as through explicit political chal-
lenges by the EPSCO Council to the jurisdiction of economic policy actors
over social and employment issues. The 2012 Semester catalysed a vigorous
pushback by member states against the Commission’s increasingly prescrip-
tive approach to the CSRs, along with its reluctance to deliberate over pro-
posed amendments with national representatives (SPC 2012a; Cypriot
Presidency 2012; EMCO Chair 2012; EMCO4, 5, 7; SPC5; Zeitlin and Vanhercke
2014: 43–4) [5].
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The mounting pressure for reorientation of the Semester and revision of its
governance procedures gained momentum and political salience through the
EU-wide debate on the social dimension of Economic and Monetary Union
initiated by the President of the European Council in 2013. EPSCO Ministers
responded by calling for a strengthening of the governance role of the
Social OMC, building on the employment guidelines, together with the moni-
toring instruments, peer reviews and multilateral surveillance procedures
developed within EMCO and the SPC. They also demanded the development
of mechanisms to facilitate ‘more effective interaction’ between the EPSCO
and ECOFIN Councils, ‘especially as regards the adoption and review of the
implementation of country specific recommendations’ (EPSCO 2013).
These conflicts resulted in a substantially revised procedural framework for
the Semester, based on a clearer allocation of responsibilities and co-ordination
in reviewing and amending the CSRs in areas of overlapping competences
between the committees and Council formations involved (Irish Presidency
2012; Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014: 46–9). Underlying this framework were
new decision-making arrangements within as well as between the participat-
ing committees. In each case, amendments to the CSRs were supported by
‘reinforced’ qualified majority voting (rQMV) to test the support for changes
to the Commission’s proposals.8 As explained above, multilateral surveillance
within the committees has likewise become crucial to the review and amend-
ment of the CSRs. Since under the ‘comply or explain’ rules of the European
Semester, the Council is expected to provide a written explanation of its
reasons for modifying the Commission’s recommendations, both committees
also refer explicitly to these multilateral reviews in the formal reports justifying
their amendments (EMCO2-6; COM-EMPL7; COM-COORD4) [6].
The revised procedural arrangements for reviewing and adopting the CSRs
had a significant impact on the success rate of amendments. In 2012, an
EMCO source estimated that proposed social and employment policy amend-
ments had no more than a ten per cent chance of success (EMCO7). In 2013,
interviewees estimated that one-third of all such proposed amendments to
the CSRs were adopted without objection by the Commission, while the
success rate for contested amendments had reached 50 per cent (EMCO4-5;
SPC5). In 2013, there were fourteen contested amendments to the CSRs, of
which ten concerned social and employment issues, compared to eleven in
2012 of which eight concerned social and employment issues. In 2014, con-
tested revisions to the CSRs on social and employment issues continued at
a similar rate, accounting for ten of eleven amendments successfully
adopted over the Commission’s opposition (own calculations from Council
of the EU 2012, 2013, 2014).
Most of these amendments concerned better contextualization of individ-
ual CSRs in relation to national challenges and reform measures. But even
when amendments concerned only a single country, they could nonetheless
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involve policy issues of EU-wide significance, as in the case of a 2012 rec-
ommendation to Sweden on improving the employment participation of
youth and vulnerable groups, which was revised to focus on enhancing the
effectiveness of labour market policies rather than wage flexibility, while
underlining the responsibility of the social partners for wage determination
(Council of the EU 2012). It was also sometimes possible to obtain ‘horizontal’
amendments to multiple CSRs addressing broader issues, as in the case of
pension reform, where the comply-or-explain text emphasized the need to
allow Member States to choose among alternative paths to reaching the
common objective of raising the effective retirement age (Council of the EU
2013). This message was endorsed by successive Council Presidencies,
which concluded that ‘Member States need some leeway to choose the
implementation path that best suits their national conditions, in particular
in areas which remain in [their] competence’, urging the Commission accord-
ingly to ‘ensure that its CSR proposals are sufficiently precise as regards policy
outcomes but not overly prescriptive as regards policy measures so as to leave
sufficient space for… national ownership… .’ (Cypriot Presidency 2012;
Lithuanian Presidency 2013).
The Juncker Commission: streamlining and further socializing
the Semester
In a speech to the European Parliament in October 2014, where Commission
President-Elect Juncker enunciated his ambition for the EU to achieve a ‘Social
Triple A’ rating, he stated that the Semester is not just an economic and finan-
cial process, but should necessarily take into account the social dimension,
including the CSRs (Juncker 2015). The new Commission promptly introduced
a series of significant innovations to the organization of the Semester. Building
on plans initiated by its predecessor and responding to member state
demands, the Juncker Commission sought to ‘streamline’ the Semester
process by integrating the MIP In-Depth Reviews with the Staff Working Docu-
ments supporting the CSRs into a single Country Report, setting out its analy-
sis of the main national reform challenges and measures taken to address
them. These Country Reports were the subject of intensive bilateral discus-
sions with member states both before and after publication. The Commission
also released both the Country Reports and CSRs earlier in the Semester cycle,
thereby leaving more time for review and debate within the Council advisory
committees. But the most fundamental change was the Commission’s
decision to reduce drastically the number and scope of the CSRs, focusing
on ‘key priority issues of macro-economic and social relevance’ identified as
actionable and monitorable within a twelve--eighteen month timescale. In
most cases, these streamlined CSRs focused more on challenges and out-
comes than on specific policy measures, ‘putt[ing] the focus on what to
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achieve instead of prescribing how to achieve it, in order to guide Member
States while leaving the necessary room for manoeuvre’. Countries further
advanced in the Excessive Deficit and Imbalance Procedures tended,
however, to receive more numerous and sharply targeted recommendations
(European Commission 2014b; 2015a; 2015b: 3; 2016b: 4–5; COM-COORD1, 3;
COM-EMPL3) [7].
The ‘streamlining’ of the Semester by the Juncker Commission was
accompanied by a further socialization of both its substantive policy
content and its governance procedures, which became increasingly visible
in the 2016 cycle.
Policy orientations
While ‘tackling unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis’ no
longer featured explicitly among the overarching priorities proposed by the
Commission, the 2015 AGS emphasized the need for measures aimed at
‘improving the dynamics in labour markets and tackling the high level of
unemployment’; ‘pension reforms… to ensure both sustainability and
adequacy’; and ‘modernising social protection systems’ to ‘be efficient and
adequate at all stages of a person’s life’, through better targeting, ‘affordable
quality childcare and education, prevention of early school leaving, training
and job assistance, housing support and accessible health care’ (European
Commission 2014b: 10–13).
Inclusive social and employment policy objectives figured even more
prominently in the 2016 AGS. Central to its policy orientations was a
renewed focus on social investment, including not only education and
training systems, but also healthcare, childcare and housing; and flexicurity,
including measures to foster transitions to permanent contracts, as well
as ‘well-designed income support systems’ and ‘policies to… equip job
seekers with the right skills and better match them with vacancies’ (European
Commission 2015c: 4–5, 7–8, 11–12). Compared to the EU’s earlier common
principles on flexicurity, which were widely criticized for neglecting the secur-
ity dimension, Bekker (2017) argues that the revised version of this concept
has become more socially orientated, acknowledging the need to reduce
flexibility in some areas. Another significant development concerned the
future of the Europe 2020 Strategy, where the Commission affirmed its com-
mitment ‘to make the best use of the existing strategy and its tools’ – includ-
ing the headline targets – ‘by improving its implementation and monitoring in
the context of the European Semester’. Hence member states were requested
in preparing their NRPs ‘to make sure that the Europe 2020 Strategy continues
to play a prominent role’ (European Commission 2015b: 5–6).
In 2015, the number of CSRs on social and employment issues fell substan-
tially compared to 2014. Using the Commission’s classification scheme, the
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drop was particularly evident in the fields of poverty and social exclusion
(from 12 to 6 member states), education and skills (from 25 to 13) and
health and long-term care (from 16 to 11 and 7 to 2 respectively) (European
Commission 2014a: Annex 1; European Commission 2015a: Annex 1). This
development was a direct consequence of the Juncker Commission’s decision
to reduce the total number of recommendations and focus their content
more sharply, while cutting down their length and scope. Considered in
relative rather than absolute terms, however, the proportion of social CSRs
did not decline (Clauwaert 2015: 10–14). Looking beneath the surface, a
striking feature of the 2015 CSRs, as Commission interviewees emphasized,
was their more integrated character, whereby social objectives were
‘mainstreamed’ into recommendations formally focused on other issues,
such as labour market policy, education and taxation (COM-EMPL2-3; COM-
COORD1-2). Thus, while only six CSRs were coded by the Commission as
addressing poverty and social inclusion, a further six member states received
recommendations to improve the educational participation and achievement
of disadvantaged groups, with particular emphasis on Roma inclusion. Four
countries also received recommendations to improve the adequacy, quality
and accessibility of their pension or healthcare systems (European Commis-
sion 2015a, Annex 1; cf. Gómez Urquijo 2017: 7).9
In 2016, despite a further reduction in the number of CSRs (to 89 from 102
in 2015), the number of discrete employment and social recommendations
contained within them remained nearly stable (114 vs. 118), resulting in an
increased relative ‘social’ prominence. On the employment side, the most
frequent recommendations received by member states concerned skills, edu-
cation and training (16) and activation and employment services (14). In other
policy areas, like taxes and undeclared work, youth employment and wage
determination, the number of CSRs fell sharply, reflecting perceived progress
in these domains. On the social side, eleven countries received recommen-
dations on poverty and social inclusion according to the Commission’s classi-
fication. Only two CSRs explicitly mentioned poverty reduction, despite
limited progress towards the Europe 2020 target and increases in the risk
and depth of poverty in more than one-third of member states. But as the
SPC observed, ‘poverty reduction can also be achieved through policy rec-
ommendations on improving the effectiveness of social protection systems’,
on which fourteen member states received CSRs, including the coverage of
social assistance schemes and the adequacy of benefits, as well as access to
and quality of social services. While the number of countries receiving CSRs
on health and long-term care remained stable, six received recommendations
explicitly addressing quality and accessibility challenges, more than in pre-
vious years. The number of member states receiving recommendations on
pensions, extending working lives and employability of older workers fell
from fifteen in 2015 to ten in 2016, reflecting the reforms carried out in this
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domain, though few CSRs explicitly addressed adequacy and sustainability
issues. As in previous years, the vast majority of CSRs specifically focused on
poverty and social exclusion were directed to Eastern and Southern countries
where the absolute problems were perceived to be most urgent, while social
inclusion concerns in Northern and Western countries were more likely to be
expressed through recommendations to enhance employment and edu-
cational participation of disadvantaged groups, facilitate transitions from pre-
carious to standard forms of employment and improve the tax and benefit
position of low-wage earners (European Commission 2016b; EMCO 2016a;
SPC 2016). Crespy and Vanheuverzwijn (2016: 77–8) conclude that the pro-
portion of 2016 CSRs promoting social investment rather than retrenchment
policy measures rose to 64 per cent, the highest rate since the Semester’s
inception.
Governance procedures
Already under the Barroso Commission, the production of the CSRs had
become an increasingly collaborative process, in which DG EMPL played a
key role in both the teams preparing the country analyses and the Core
Group responsible for drafting the recommendations themselves. Beginning
in 2015, this process was carried a step further, as DG EMPL was charged
with drafting the chapter on social and employment policy in the new
Country Reports, which incorporated the MIP In-Depth Reviews previously
written by DG ECFIN alone. DG EMPL also played an even more prominent
part within the Core Group itself, as one of three line DGs working under
SECGEN’s lead. In so doing, DG EMPL could draw on substantial in-house
policy and country expertise built up over the preceding years, as well as
on key units dealing with Labour Market Policy and Training and Skills trans-
ferred by the Juncker Commission from DGs ECFIN and Education and Culture
(EAC) respectively. In healthcare, DG Health and Food Safety (SANTE) contrib-
uted both to the Country Reports and CSRs, drawing on detailed country
knowledge developed in recent years along with an indicator-based analytical
tool for assessing the performance of national systems (COM COORD1; COM-
EMPL2-4; COM-ECFIN1-2; COM-OTHER1-2).
A key objective behind the streamlining of the Semester, including both its
revised timetable and the refocusing of the CSRs, was to increase national
‘ownership’ of recommended reforms and thereby improve their implemen-
tation (European Commission 2015a: 3, 10). Our interviewees and EU commit-
tee documents together confirm that these changes have been broadly
welcomed by the member states, especially the opportunity to discuss and
sometimes correct the Commission’s analysis of national reform challenges
and implementation progress in both bilateral and multilateral settings.
There was broad agreement that as a result, the quality and accuracy of the
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analysis in the Commission’s Country Reports was much higher than in pre-
vious years. National representatives also largely approved of the sharper
focus of the CSRs on a reduced number of key priorities, together with the
Commission’s greater emphasis on outcomes rather than specific policy
measures in responding to national challenges, though some recommen-
dations (e.g., on pensions) were still considered overly prescriptive (SPC2;
EMCO1; EPC1; COM-EMPL3; COM-ECFIN1; COM-COORD3; EMCO 2016b; SPC
2016) [8].
Streamlining appears to have improved the relationship between the
EPSCO and ECOFIN Councils, as well as between the Commission and the
member states. The revised Semester timetable gave EMCO and the SPC
more time to discuss and review both the Commission’s Country Reports
and the CSRs, enriching the process of multilateral surveillance and contribut-
ing to the formation of internal consensus on proposed reforms. It also
allowed for enhanced co-ordination of views across national delegations,
which had previously been a major source of tension between social and
economic policy actors. Compared to earlier years, there was better
co-ordination between the EPSCO and ECOFIN advisory committees, ensuring
‘a coordinated and balanced preparation of the CSRs’ adoption by the
Council’, according to the SPC’s own 2016 assessment. The main outstanding
complaint of the EPSCO committees was the high proportion of social and
employment policy CSRs issued under the SGP and MIP, which fall under
the formal jurisdiction of the ECOFIN Council (SPC1-2; EMCO1; EPC1; COM-
EMPL4; EMCO 2016b; SPC 2016; cf. Maricut and Puetter 2017) [9].
But even where EU economic policy actors formally retain a leading role,
they appear to have internalized some of the objectives and concerns cham-
pioned by their social interlocutors. Thus DG ECFIN’s ‘Horizontal Assessment
Framework for Age-Related Fiscal Sustainability Challenges’ included indi-
cators for quality and accessibility of healthcare in 2016 for the first time,
leading directly to the multiplication of CSRs on these issues (European Com-
mission 2016a). And the Eurogroup itself has begun to discuss how pension
reforms can be made ‘more acceptable, socially viable and lasting’ through
flanking policies aimed at extending working lives such as lifelong learning,
workplace adaptations and flexible working arrangements for older employ-
ees (European Commission 2015d).
Given the reduced number of CSRs, member states managed to obtain in
2015 a similar proportion as in previous years of contested amendments on
social and employment issues, which accounted for six of nine successful
amendments opposed by the Commission (own calculations from Council of
the EU 2015a). In two of these cases (Finland and Italy), the CSRs were
amended to recognize explicitly the autonomous role of the social partners in
wage bargaining. In 2016, the improved accuracy of the CSRs resulting from
intensified dialogue with member states around the Country Reports appear
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to have reduced demand for amendments, while the Commission also seems to
have been more willing than in previous years to accept revisions proposed by
EMCO and the SPC based on evidence from their multilateral surveillance
reviews. The only contested social amendment adopted over the Commission’s
objections was to the euro area CSRs, where the EPSCO Council successfully
insisted that national reforms should promote ‘adequate and sustainable
social protection systems that contribute effectively throughout the lifecycle
both to social inclusion and labor market integration’, rather than focusing
more narrowly on work incentives and targeted support for those in need
(Council of the EU 2015b; European Parliament 2016; Bekker 2017).
Conclusions
Between 2011 and 2016, a partial but progressive socialization of the Seme-
ster occurred. This shift was visible at the level of substantive policy orien-
tations, in terms of a growing emphasis on social objectives in the AGS and
especially the CSRs. The latter expanded considerably from year to year in
social scope and ambition, placing increasing stress on the need for
member states to ensure the adequacy, accessibility, and effectiveness of
their social security, pension and healthcare systems; to combat poverty
and social exclusion on a variety of dimensions; and to improve their
education, training, childcare, employment and social services, especially for
vulnerable groups – even if the growing volume and coverage of these
social CSRs was still counterbalanced by recommendations to many countries
on fiscal consolidation and competitiveness.
The socialization of the Semester was equally visible at the level of govern-
ance procedures, in terms of an enhanced role for EU social and employment
policy actors in monitoring, reviewing and amending the CSRs. Jurisdictional
struggles continued with EU economic policy actors about overlapping issues,
especially those linked to the SGP and MIP. But revisions to the Semester’s
procedural framework, coupled with the detailed knowledge of the social
and employment situation in the member states built up through intensified
monitoring, mutual surveillance, and peer review, made it possible for EMCO
and the SPC, as well as for DG EMPL, to feed their views into the process at key
moments. These developments also enabled the EPSCO committees to push
through amendments of the Commission’s draft CSRs on both larger and
smaller issues, despite the high rQMV threshold.
Member state representatives were able to push back against what they
perceived as ‘over-prescriptive’, ‘one-size-fits-all’ recommendations from the
Commission, which sought to lay down not only reform objectives, but also
the specific way of reaching them, without taking sufficient account of
national contexts and competences. By demonstrating their ability to
amend the draft CSRs, these committees compelled the Commission to
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engage more deliberatively with member states in both multilateral and bilat-
eral forums. Responding to persistent criticisms of its limited social dimension
and weak national ownership, the incoming Juncker Commission strategically
revamped the Semester process, ‘by giving more time for dialogue with the
Member States and mainstreaming social considerations alongside economic
goals’, as the 2017 AGS (European Commission 2016c: 4) proudly proclaims,
leading to a further socialization of both its substantive policy content and
governance procedures. The governance of the Semester has likewise
become less hierarchical and more interactive, while the CSRs, especially in
the social and employment field, have become less uniform, less prescriptive,
and better adapted to national circumstances. Thus, since its inception in
2011, the Semester has slowly but steadily evolved in a more socially balanced
direction in relation to each of the three critical empirical claims discussed in
the introduction.
This progressive socialization of the Semester can be interpreted as a
response by the Commission and other EU institutions to external develop-
ments, notably rising social and political discontent among European citizens
with austerity policies, demonstrated by falling levels of public support for
the EU and electoral defeats for incumbent governments in many countries.
But it should also be understood as the product of strategic agency, reflexive
learning and creative adaptation by EU social and employment actors of
their own organization and practices in response to the new institutional con-
ditions of the Semester.10 This process began with the employment policy
actors within EMCO and DG EMPL, who were already familiar with the chal-
lenges of debating their positions with the economic policy actors under
the Integrated Guidelines of the Lisbon Strategy and took the first steps to
strengthen their intelligence-gathering and analytical capacities through the
development of new monitoring instruments, the intensification of multilat-
eral surveillance, and the introduction of rQMV on amendments to the Com-
mission’s draft CSRs. Their example was quickly emulated by the social policy
actors within the SPC and DG EMPL, who not only followed suit in developing
new instruments to monitor and analyse the Semester’s social dimension,
deepening multilateral surveillance of CSR implementation and adopting
rQMV for amending the CSRs, but also proactively used the institutional
acquis and flexibility of the Social OMC to introduce new social reporting
initiatives at both national and EU level and to foster mutual learning on
promising approaches to tackling common policy challenges beyond those
flagged in the CSRs. These innovations in turn helped EU social and employ-
ment policy actors not only to gain ground in ‘evidence-based’ negotiations
over the CSRs, but also to revise the rules of the Semester game and influence
the positions of their economic policy interlocutors on some key issues. ‘Puz-
zling’ and ‘powering’ (Heclo 1974) thus went hand-in-hand in socializing the
European Semester.
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In understanding how such apparentlyweaker actors can advance their sub-
stantive goals and decision-making influence despite the institutional asym-
metries and structural power imbalances underlined by the Semester’s social
critics, ‘actor-centred constructivism’ and the ‘usages of Europe’ approach
provide valuable conceptual resources. Complex governance processes like
the European Semester, as these approaches emphasize, do not narrowly pre-
determine the outcome of political struggles, but typically offer multiple
opportunities and resources for strategic agency by contending groups of
actors, whose effective exploitation depends on the latter’s ability and willing-
ness to identify and act upon them. By seizing such opportunities and crea-
tively adapting their own organization and practices, these actors may be
able to reshape pre-existing power balances and procedural rules even
where the overarching institutional framework remains formally unchanged.
The socialization of the European Semester demonstrates in turn the power
of these theoretical approaches to illuminate the evolution and dynamics of
EU governance processes, along with the usage of such processes by national
actors to which they have mainly been applied in previous research.
An outstanding empirical issue remains the domestic implementation and
causal influence of the European Semester on national social and employ-
ment policies. This issue, as observed at the outset, requires a different
research approach, based on comparative process tracing of national
policy-making, similar to that developed in empirical studies of the OMC
(Barcevičius et al. 2014). Here, too, ‘actor-centred constructivism’ and the
‘usages of Europe’ approach are of great potential value, by emphasizing
the scope for creative appropriation of EU targets and recommendations, as
initial research like that of Eihmanis (2017) on ‘cherry-picking external con-
straints’ and the implementation of social CSRs in Latvia illustrates. In the
absence of more such empirical studies, however, scholars should not
assume the existence of a direct relationship between the formal legal basis
of the CSRs and their national influence, as much of the critical literature on
the social dimension of the Semester discussed earlier appears to do,
especially since no sanctions have yet been imposed on member states for
non-compliance with either the MIP or the SGP.11
Notes
1. Notably the Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs (DG ECFIN), the Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) Council, the
Eurogroup, the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) and the Economic
Policy Committee (EPC).
2. Especially the Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment and
Social Affairs (DG EMPL), the Employment and Social Affairs (EPSCO)
Council and the Employment and Social Protection Committees (EMCO
and SPC).
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3. Crespy and Verheuverzwijn suggest that this trend could stem from higher
implementation rates of retrenchment-orientated recommendations, but do
not provide supporting evidence for this interpretation.
4. References to this Appendix are indicated in the body of the text by bold
numbers in square brackets.
5. AGSs, proposed CSRs, and CSRs as adopted by the Council are available for
2011-2014 at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/index_en.
htm. Countries covered by an Economic Adjustment Programme or Memoran-
dum of Understanding do not receive CSRs under the European Semester.
6. For a country key to this and subsequent CSR analyses, see Online
Appendix Section 2. Figures in the text refer to numbers of member states
receiving recommendations on a particular topic, not to numbers of CSRs or rec-
ommended measures. The number of member states receiving CSRs varies from
year to year, as countries subject to an Economic Adjustment Programme are
excluded.
7. For a discussion of the 2012-2013 CSRs, along with a country key to socially
orientated recommendations referred to in the text, see Online Appendix,
Section 2.
8. Under the Lisbon Treaty, when the Council takes a decision not based on a
Commission proposal, this must be supported by a ‘reinforced’ qualified
majority comprising 72 per cent of member states accounting for 65 per cent
of the Union’s population (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/
reinforced_qualified_majority.html).
9. For an analysis of ‘hidden’ social recommendations in the 2015 CSRs, see Online
Appendix Section 3.
10. For reasons of space, we do not discuss in this contribution EU social NGOs and
social partner organisations, who played a limited role in the evolution and
dynamics of the European Semester during this period. For extended analyses,
see Zeitlin and Vanhercke (2014: 54–5); Vanhercke et al. (2015: 15–17); Sabato et
al. (2017).
11. Apart from a small fine levied on Spain for fraudulent fiscal reporting by one of
its autonomous regions, exposed by the national statistical office itself (Savage
and Howarth 2017).
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